

Agnira MUN 2026

CCC

(CONTINUOUS CRISIS COMMITTEE)

AGENDA

Freeze Date- 25th June 1948

BACKGROUND GUIDE

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear Distinguished Delegates,

It is with great honor and a profound sense of historical gravity that we welcome you to the Continuous Crisis Committee (CCC) at Agnira MUN 2026. As we choose our Freeze Date for the 12th of June, 1948, we present to you a world poised on the verge of entering a new era. It is time to consider the issues that define the 20th century: the fall of empires, the beginning of the cold war, and the urgent call for self-determination.

Post World War II did not bring peace to the world. We stand in the junction between the crumbling imperial world order and the beginning of the cold war. From the forests of Southeast Asia to the dry terrains of the Levant and the administrative offices of post-war Europe, the call for self-determination faces off against the declining interests of fading superpowers.

It is our plea to you to attend with researched positions and an open mind and strive to be strategic and innovative. Get to know your nations' interests and the geopolitics of 1948 and engage with sincerity with different viewpoints.

Your crisis management will receive guidance and assistance from the Executive Board. There should be no hesitations in seeking clarification of process or content related to the crisis that is currently unfolding. We have faith in your ability to deliver results that will shape tomorrow's world.

We thus Remind you that while this Guide may prompt you in a certain direction, by no means does that validate nor does it refute that perspective, and thus as a result we emphasise on delegates doing extensive research into their foreign policies. While new ideas are inherently disruptive, they are far less disruptive than a world dominated by stereotypes and regional instability. This guide cannot and will not be accepted as proof of statements during committee proceedings under any circumstances whatsoever.

Warm Regards,
The Executive Board
Continuous Crisis Committee

Ayaan Khan
Chairperson
Avani Reddy
Vice-Chairperson
Sarvasv
Rappoteur

What is a Model United Nations (MUN)?

Model United Nations, or MUN, is a simulation of the United Nations where Delegates take on the roles of diplomats representing different countries. Each delegate researches their nation's policies, debates global issues, and works with others to draft and pass resolutions, just like in the real UN. Committees are based on actual UN bodies, such as the Security Council or Human Rights Council, and follow adapted versions of their procedures. Most popularly the UNA/USA ROP.

Goal of an MUN

The main goal of an MUN is to help participants understand how international diplomacy actually works, through discussion, compromise, and negotiation rather than conflict. Delegates learn to think from a country's perspective, defend national interests, and find solutions that balance realism with cooperation. Beyond policy-making, it builds public speaking, critical thinking, and teamwork skills while encouraging awareness of world affairs. We wish for Delegates to be able to incorporate these skills into their learning experience from the conference.

Rules of Procedure (RoP)

The **UNA/USA Rules of Procedure (RoP)** are the most widely used and recognized format in Model United Nations conferences worldwide. They are designed to ensure that debate proceeds in an organized, diplomatic, and efficient manner, closely reflecting the operations of the actual United Nations. The elements within the UNA/USA RoP that help the committee function effectively are as follows:

- **Motions:** These are formal requests made by delegates to direct the flow of debate such as moving into a moderated or unmoderated caucus, setting or closing the agenda, or entering voting procedure. Motions determine the pace and structure of the session and must be approved by the dais or through a procedural vote.
- **Points:** Points allow delegates to address procedural issues or seek clarification during debate. Common examples include Points of Order (to correct procedural errors), Points of Personal Privilege (for issues of

audibility or comfort), and Points of Inquiry (to ask questions about procedure).

- **Formal Debate:** Conducted through the Speakers' List, this is where delegates make prepared speeches outlining their country's stance and proposed solutions. It forms the backbone of discussion and ensures equal speaking opportunity.
- **Moderated Caucus:** A semi-formal phase where the dais recognizes speakers for shorter, focused interventions on specific subtopics, allowing faster-paced and interactive discussion.
- **Unmoderated Caucus:** An informal, negotiation-based phase where delegates can move freely, form blocs, and collaborate on working papers or draft resolutions.

Here is a link that would help delegates understand the UNA/USA Rules of Procedure better:

[\[http://www.gecmun.com/uploads/2/3/7/0/23702810/%5bgecmun_x%5d_rules_of_procedure_-_una-usa.pdf\]](http://www.gecmun.com/uploads/2/3/7/0/23702810/%5bgecmun_x%5d_rules_of_procedure_-_una-usa.pdf).

The EB would also like to put to notice to the delegates that since our simulation would be of a Joint Crisis Committee, There would be no formal Documentation at the end of the Committee as there is in a Standard UN Committee, There would not be Draft resolutions. Subjective to Committee flow, Upon the discretion of the EB, the committee may end in a press release.

Along with the UNA/USA RoP, this committee will also follow **Crisis Rules of Procedure**

What are Directives?

The **Executive Board (EB)** sets the stage for this committee as a **meeting of Foreign Ministers**. Delegates, acting as their respective nations' foreign ministers, engage in discussions and negotiations reflecting their country's foreign policy priorities. Based on these deliberations, ministers may send **recommendations and instructions**, known as **Directives**, to their **Heads of State, national governments, or relevant agencies**. These directives communicate the delegate's proposed course of action in response to developments within the committee and the evolving situation on the agenda.

A **Directive** is a formal written communication drafted by a delegate that outlines a specific action, decision, or recommendation their government should undertake. It is the central mechanism through which delegates attempt to influence events within the simulation. Directives may address diplomatic, economic, military, or humanitarian measures, and their effectiveness depends on clarity, relevance, and strategic value.

A **Joint Directive** is a directive written and submitted by two or more delegates acting together, typically representing aligned states or partners. For a joint directive to be considered valid, it must carry the **signatures of all participating delegates** involved in its creation and endorsement.

Directives may also be categorized as **Covert** or **Overt**:

- **Covert Directives** represent secret communications or actions known only to the delegate(s) and the Executive Board. These are not announced publicly in committee but may result in updates or developments revealed later through the crisis arc.
- **Overt Directives** are public communications or official diplomatic messages that are openly recognized by the committee and can influence inter-state perception, alliances, or negotiation dynamics.

Once submitted, directives are reviewed and processed by the Executive Board, and their outcomes are classified into the following categories:

1. **Passed with Outcome:** The directive is approved, and its effects are visible to the committee or the wider world through an update or change in the simulation.
2. **Passed without Outcome:** The directive is approved, but its implementation or results remain undisclosed to the committee, with no visible updates provided.
3. **Failed:** The directive is rejected, meaning it has no impact or resulting change within the simulation.

A Directive Shall only be entertained when it is in the following Format:

Directive Name/Number-

From-

To-

Covert/Overt

Joint/Solo

Primary Objective:

Secondary Objective(not compulsory):

Mission Brief:

Plan of Action:

Additional Information:

Signatories to the Directives:

ABOUT THE AGENDA:

The Berlin Blockade of 1948

At the close of the Second World War, the victorious Allies – the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union – divided and occupied a defeated Germany into four zones. Berlin, though it lay deep inside the Soviet-controlled eastern portion of the country, was itself carved into occupation sectors: the Americans, British, and French administered the western districts of the city, while Soviet forces held the east. So long as the wartime alliance endured, this arrangement was workable. As that alliance decayed into open hostility, however, a single question came to define the first great crisis of the emerging Cold War: would the western sectors of Berlin remain under Western Allied control, or would the whole city be absorbed into the Soviet-controlled east?

President Truman has framed the confrontation as “a move to test our ability and our will to resist,” and that framing captures why the Western powers regard the stakes as extending far beyond the city itself. To abandon Berlin would be to signal to the whole of a war-ravaged Europe that Western guarantees are hollow; to hold it is to demonstrate resolve at the very frontier of Soviet power.

Three developments have driven the Soviets toward the present blockade. The first is the Marshall Plan for European Recovery, the great American programme of reconstruction aid. In March 1947, responding to communist pressure in Greece and Turkey, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine, pledging American support for free peoples resisting subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure. Three months later the Marshall Plan was introduced as the economic and financial extension of that Doctrine – and the Soviet Union has read both as instruments aimed squarely at the consolidation of a Western bloc. The second development is the series of London Conferences held from February to June of 1948, in which the United States, Britain, France, and the BENELUX nations concluded that four-power quadripartite control of Germany alongside the Soviets was no longer workable, and began re-examining their policies accordingly. The third, and the immediate trigger, is the resultant London Program.

The London Program's central aim is the establishment of a West German government. Its chosen means are the fusion of the three western occupation zones into a single administered economic unit and a thoroughgoing reform of the currency, so that a uniform, stable exchange might prevail throughout the western sectors. When the communiqué on the Program was issued on the 6th of March, the Soviets responded in April by constraining the military supplies moving into Berlin through their zone from the west. This confronted the Western nations with a stark choice: to be squeezed politically out of West Berlin – diminishing their prestige across Europe – or to remain, press ahead with currency reform, and ultimately midwife a separate West German state.

The Western allies chose to remain. In mid-June the west introduced a new currency in its zones (though not, at first, in western Berlin), and the Soviet Union issued its own currency in the east. On the 23rd of June the Western Deutschmark was brought into Berlin itself. That night the Soviets cut power to the western half of the city, and the following day they

imposed a complete blockade. Railways and highways have been restricted so that no surface traffic can pass between the western zones and Berlin. The Soviets have accomplished this without formally breaching international law, resting on a technicality: the West and the Soviet Union never concluded a written pact guaranteeing a right of Western ground access to Berlin. It is worth the committee's careful note that Stalin has issued no ultimatum, and that even with the blockade in force the Soviets have kept the door to negotiation open. This is a crisis engineered as much for leverage as for conquest, and the resolution of it – whether by pressure, by airlift, or by settlement – remains genuinely open at the present date.

The Arab–Israeli War of 1948

On the 29th of November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, the Partition Resolution, which provided for the division of Great Britain's former Palestinian mandate into a Jewish state and an Arab state, with the religiously significant area surrounding Jerusalem to remain a *corpus separatum* under international administration by the United Nations. The resolution was supported by both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Palestinian Arabs and the Arab League refused to recognise the arrangement, regarding it as favourable to the Jews and unjust to the Arab population that would be left within Jewish territory under the partition. The United States sought a middle course – backing the resolution while simultaneously encouraging direct negotiation between Arabs and Jews.

The resolution ignited conflict between Jewish and Arab communities within Palestine almost at once. Fighting opened with attacks by irregular bands of Palestinian Arabs attached to local units of the Arab Liberation Army, a force of volunteers drawn from Palestine and the neighbouring Arab countries, striking at Jewish cities, settlements, and armed forces. The Jewish side was composed of the Haganah – the underground militia of the Jewish community – together with two smaller irregular organisations, the Irgun and LEHI. The initial Arab objective was to block the Partition Resolution outright and to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state; the Jewish objective was to secure control of the territory allotted under the Partition Plan. The intervening months were marked by a grinding pattern of skirmishes, road ambushes, riots, bombings, and massacres, whether organised by one side or the other or erupting spontaneously, and by an Arab blockade of Jerusalem that the Jewish forces repeatedly sought to break.

The State of Israel was declared on Friday, the 14th of May 1948, in advance of the Sabbath, and was recognised immediately by the United States and, on the 17th of May, by the Soviet Union. The declaration transformed a communal conflict into an interstate war. On the eve of the 14th the Arabs launched an air attack on Tel Aviv, which the Israelis resisted; this was followed by the invasion of the former mandate by the armies of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Transjordan, with Saudi Arabia contributing a formation that fought under Egyptian command. The British-trained Arab Legion of Transjordan intervened chiefly in areas designated as part of the Arab state under the Partition Plan and in the *corpus*

separatum of Jerusalem. Egyptian columns pressed northward along the coastal road from Gaza toward Tel Aviv; Syrian forces attacked in the north-east; and the Jordan Legion moved into Jerusalem, closing the Jewish quarter of the Old City, which fell to the Legion on the 28th of May with some three hundred Haganah defenders taken prisoner.

After tense early fighting the Israeli forces, now consolidated under a joint command, were able to seize the offensive in several sectors. The United Nations has been pressing for a halt to the fighting, and a first truce has now been arranged, beginning on the 11th of June. At the present date the war is suspended in this fragile truce rather than concluded: the belligerent armies remain in the field, the status of Jerusalem is unresolved, and whether the pause will hold or collapse back into general war is precisely the kind of question this committee may be called upon to influence.

The Greek Civil War

Greece entered the present decade in profound instability. General Ioannis Metaxas had governed through a fascist-style dictatorship until his death in 1941, which left the country politically hollow. Into that vacuum stepped the Communist Party, which organised the National Liberation Front, known as the EAM. A rival organisation, the National Republican Greek League (EDES), formed in opposition, and the two fought each other through the winter of 1943–1944. The EDES drew support from the British, who were deeply anxious about a communist takeover of Greece.

The shape of the wider settlement was decided as much in the chancelleries as on the ground. When Churchill met Stalin in 1944, the two reached an understanding by which Churchill would concede Soviet primacy in Romania in exchange for a free hand in Greece. As the Germans withdrew, Stalin honoured the bargain and extended no help to the Greek communists, even though they were the strongest armed force in the country. On the 2nd of December 1944, fighting broke out between the British and the EAM; the nationalists prevailed and the size of the Communist party was sharply reduced. The Varkiza Agreement that followed required the communist ELAS to surrender its weapons and release its political prisoners, while the government undertook to build a national army and establish a democratic order.

That settlement did not hold. Elections held in March of 1946 were widely regarded as corrupt and delivered a result heavily favouring the EDES. In response the Communists formed the Democratic Army of Greece (DA), declaring that they fought to restore Greek democracy. Through the first year of renewed fighting the DA held the advantage: it controlled the northern part of the country and drew support, weapons, and sanctuary from neighbouring Yugoslavia, operating along the frontiers of Yugoslavia and Albania and across southern Greece by means of guerrilla warfare.

The British, financially and militarily overstretched, withdrew their support and turned to the United States. In 1947 President Truman issued the Truman Doctrine expressly to help Greece resist the Communists, initiating an emergency request for four hundred million

dollars to aid Greece and Turkey and, through the American Mission for Aid to Greece and the broader Marshall Plan, channelling dollars and arms to the nationalist side. As American support flowed in, the nationalist army grew substantially stronger. A further fracture has now opened on the communist side: Stalin's rupture with Yugoslavia's leader, Tito, has placed the DA in an impossible position, and its decision to side with Stalin threatens the Yugoslav support on which it has depended. A still darker feature of the conflict is the Paidomazoma – the removal, from March 1948, of Greek children between the ages of four and fourteen into Socialist states. The war continues at the present date, with the nationalist position strengthening but the outcome not yet settled.

Yugoslavia and the COMINFORM

The Soviet Union established COMINFORM in 1947 as a coordinating body for the communist parties of Russia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Italy, France, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Most Western observers have read the organisation as the successor to the Communist International – the COMINTERN, which Russia had dissolved in 1943 as a gesture to placate its wartime allies. Its creation signalled that, with the hardening of Cold War animosities, the Soviet Union was once again setting itself up as the acknowledged leader of the communist bloc. The deliberate inclusion of the Italian and French parties served notice that Moscow intended to shape political developments well beyond its eastern European satellites.

Yugoslavia was an original member, but its leader, Josef Broz Tito, has proven strikingly reluctant to follow the Soviet line. Throughout 1947 and into 1948 Tito criticised Stalin sharply for his failure to assist the communists fighting for power in Greece. When Tito refused to soften his complaints, Stalin has now ordered Yugoslavia expelled from COMINFORM – an event of the very first importance, for it represents the first open fracture within the communist bloc and the first demonstration that a communist state might defy Moscow and survive. The United States has every reason to be delighted by the split, and the manner in which the Western powers respond to an independent-minded Tito – whether by courtship, by aid, or by wariness – is a live question at the present date. Tito, for his part, has shown no willingness to be the puppet of any government, Moscow included.

Indonesian National Revolution

Unlike Burma and the Philippines, Indonesia was not granted formal independence by the Japanese in 1943, and no Indonesian representative was sent to the Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo that November. As the war grew desperate, however, Japan announced in September 1944 that not merely Java but the entire archipelago would

become independent – a vindication of the seemingly collaborative policies of the nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta. In March 1945 the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) was convened to draft a constitution, drawing delegates from Java, Sumatra, and the eastern archipelago. Its ambitions were expansive: it envisaged a Greater Indonesia (Indonesia Raya) embracing not only the Netherlands Indies but Portuguese Timor, British North Borneo, and the Malay Peninsula, and it provided for a strong presidency.

Sukarno's vision of a unitary, secular state collided with Muslim aspirations, and the tension was bridged by the Jakarta Charter, a compromise under which the state would rest on belief in one God and require Muslims to follow the sharia. Muslim leaders came to regard this concession – subordinating their preferred vision of the state to the priority of national independence – as a great sacrifice, and it has remained a point of contention. On the 1st of June 1945 Sukarno delivered his speech articulating the Pancasila, the five guiding principles of the nation: belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, and social justice.

When Japan surrendered on the 15th of August 1945, the Indonesian leadership, pressed by radical youth groups known as the pemuda, moved swiftly. With the cooperation of individual Japanese officers, Sukarno and Hatta declared independence on the 17th of August at Sukarno's residence in Jakarta, raised the red and white flag, sang Indonesia Raya, and promulgated a constitution the following day. The republic's prospects, however, were deeply uncertain. The Dutch, determined to reoccupy their colony, denounced Sukarno and Hatta as Japanese collaborators, though the Netherlands, ravaged by the Nazi occupation, lacked the strength to reassert its authority quickly. The archipelago fell under the command of Admiral Mountbatten, and Allied troops – largely of the British Commonwealth – did not land on Java until late September.

The struggle was bloodiest at Surabaya in East Java, where violence erupted on the 28th of October 1945 as British troops clashed with the pemuda. After the British commander, A.W.S. Mallaby, and hundreds of troops were killed, the British mounted a fierce counterattack; the Battle of Surabaya, from the 10th to the 24th of November, cost thousands of lives, was the single bloodiest engagement of the revolution, and forced the Allies to reckon with the republic as a fact. Diplomacy followed the fighting. The British-brokered Linggajati Agreement, initialled in November 1946 and signed on the 25th of May 1947, provided for Dutch recognition of republican rule on Java and Sumatra within a loose Netherlands-Indonesian Union under the Dutch crown. Neither party was content, and on the 21st of July 1947 the Dutch, alleging violations, launched a euphemistically named “police action,” driving the republicans out of Sumatra and much of Java and confining them to the Yogyakarta region of Central Java. International reaction was strongly negative; the United Nations Security Council established a Good Offices Committee, and the resulting Renville Agreement – named for the United States Navy vessel on which it was negotiated – was ratified by both sides on the 17th of January 1948. It conceded temporary Dutch control of the areas seized in the police action but provided for referendums in the occupied territories on their political future. That uneasy settlement is where matters stand at the present date.

Czechoslovakia's Coup d'état

After the Second World War, Czechoslovakia looked with favour on the Russians who had liberated it, and the Communist Party enjoyed a solid following that reached back to the 1920s. Eduard Beneš, who became the post-war president, had signed a friendship treaty with the Soviets while leading the government-in-exile in 1943, and the Czechoslovak army and administrative structures were modelled after Soviet ones. By the beginning of 1946 there was no Soviet military presence in the country, yet Communists were strongly represented in government: Klement Gottwald served as Prime Minister, and Communists held the ministries of the interior, agriculture, information, defence, and education. The May 1946 elections confirmed the Party's genuine popularity, delivering it thirty-eight percent of the vote.

From May 1946 until July of 1947 the country seemed to run smoothly. The rupture came over the Marshall Plan. When Czechoslovakia moved to obtain American aid, the Soviet Union forbade its ally from accepting, insisting that acceptance would breach the existing friendship treaty. That decision cost the Communists dearly in public esteem, as did mounting economic difficulty, farmers' resistance to collectivisation, and disappointment at the pace of industrialisation. By January of 1948 a public opinion poll showed Communist popularity fallen to twenty-five percent, with little support among students. The Communists reacted to criticism with force; in November of 1947 several non-Communist ministers received parcel bombs, most probably at Communist hands.

The decisive crisis then arrived. Minister of the Interior Nosek and Prime Minister Gottwald refused to yield to opposition demands. The trade unions rallied to the Party, and the Communists established armed "action committees" in factories, farms, and villages, forming a people's militia of seven thousand on the 20th of February. The twelve non-Communist ministers tendered their resignations, gambling that President Beneš would form a new government free of the Communist Party – but the gamble failed. Violent Communist-led demonstrations erupted, armed trade unionists rioted in the streets of Prague and attacked the offices of the opposition, and the one force capable of resisting, the Army, was itself commanded by the Communist General Ludvík Svoboda. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin, ostensibly in Prague to oversee grain shipments, assured the army that the Russians would halt any Western interference, and the Red Army took up positions along the Czechoslovak borders.

Beneš was placed in an impossible position. He feared both Soviet intervention and outright civil war; he hesitated, and made the grave error of not rallying the non-Communists to act. He also, mistakenly, believed that a Soviet-style communism in Czechoslovakia would prove moderate rather than extreme, and he wished the USSR to remain a significant power in Eastern Europe as a check on any German resurgence. Gottwald then threatened a general strike and presented Beneš with a list of so-called reactionaries to be punished should he refuse to sign the Communist government's slate of proposals. Beneš accepted, and thereby delivered effective power to the Party. The consolidation of a communist Czechoslovakia in the heart of Europe, achieved by pressure rather than open invasion, stands as one of the most alarming developments of the present period for the Western powers.

The Indo-Pak War of 1948

The first war between India and Pakistan, which began in October 1947 and continues at the present date, has its origins in the unresolved status of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir following the independence of India and Pakistan on the 15th of August 1947. British policy held that each princely state should accede to one dominion or the other on the basis of geographic location and demographic composition. Most cases were readily settled; Kashmir was not. The state was strategically wedged between the two new nations and, though its population was overwhelmingly Muslim, it was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, Hari Singh, who could not bring himself to choose. Pakistan held that Kashmir, as a Muslim-majority territory contiguous to it, ought naturally to accede to Pakistan; yet much of the population, including a majority within the Muslim community itself, favoured accession to India or outright independence.

Hostilities opened in early October 1947 with a tribal rebellion in Poonch, in the state's south-west. By the 20th of October the Pakistani Army had entered the conflict in support of the tribal forces, in a multi-pronged effort aimed at capturing Uri, Jhangar, Rajuara, and Naushera, with the ambition of seizing the capital, Srinagar, within a week. On the 22nd of October a lashkar of some five thousand tribesmen crossed into the valley from Abbottabad, taking Domel on the first day and overpowering a Kashmiri government battalion at Muzaffarabad by the 23rd. The tribal and Pakistani forces met fierce resistance at Uri, took Baramula, damaged the power station at Mahura that supplied Srinagar, and pressed to within a few miles of the capital's airfield. The tribesmen's descent into looting and killing – most notoriously at Baramula, which drove out over ten thousand residents – slowed their own advance.

Facing near-certain defeat, the Maharaja appealed to India for military aid. India agreed on the condition that Kashmir accede to the Indian Union and that the state's Prime Minister endorse the accession. Both agreed, and on the 26th of October the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession. India has treated the accession as provisional, to be confirmed in due course by a plebiscite of the Kashmiri people, since it recognises Kashmir as disputed territory; it is a point of live legal contention that the Instrument itself specifies no such conditionality, while the Indian White Paper does, opening a gap between strict legal interpretation and repeated official promise. Pakistan, for its part, disputes the accession as illegal, arguing that the Maharaja acted under duress and had no right to conclude an agreement with India while a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan remained in force.

Lord Mountbatten, as Governor-General, moved with speed to air-lift Indian troops to halt the incursion. When the Quaid-e-Azam ordered General Gracy, acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, to despatch regular troops, the British general declined, deferring instead to Field Marshal Auchinleck, who threatened that an act of invasion over Kashmir would trigger the automatic withdrawal of all British officers from the Pakistan Army – a threat that would have gutted the army's command structure and compelled the Quaid to cancel his mobilisation orders. India's 161st Infantry Brigade, using armoured cars, was flown into Srinagar, broke through the attackers' defences, secured the airfield, restored power to the city, and retook Baramula and Uri. The Indian advance then faltered in December 1947 amid

logistical strain and the hardships of high-altitude winter warfare, for which its troops were ill-prepared, allowing the Pakistani-backed forces to recover ground.

In the spring of 1948 India mounted a fresh offensive to recover lost territory, and Pakistani regulars have since been introduced into the fighting, targeting the city of Jammu. The conflict now ranges widely across both the northern and southern sectors. Unable to foresee a swift end without committing considerable resources, Indian leaders brought the matter to the United Nations Security Council on the 1st of January 1948, and the United Nations has introduced Observers as of June 1948. The war is unresolved at the present date: the fighting continues, the plebiscite remains unheld, and the competing claims of the two dominions confront one another without settlement.

Soviet Deportations from the Baltic Region

By June 1940 the Soviet Union had invaded and occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and set in motion at once a reign of repression and terror. The NKVD began by registering and tracking those it deemed anti-Soviet, and soon proceeded to arrests, deportations, and executions, with the deliberate aim of eliminating the cultural, commercial, political, and military elite of each nation. After the three states were illegally annexed into the Soviet Union in August 1940, the Kremlin moved to suppress any possibility of resistance. In May 1941 the NKVD received formal instructions to exterminate active persons – among them members of former governments, militaries, police, political bodies, and voluntary state-defence organisations, as well as members of student organisations, foreign companies, and various minorities. The top-secret directive on the deportation of the “socially alien element” from the Baltic republics and other annexed territories declared the regime’s enemies to be subject to arrest or deportation without any legal process whatever.

On the 14th of June 1941 the USSR began its first mass deportation from the region, an operation lasting four days. Soviet armed groups surrounded homes and removed their inhabitants in silence – children and the elderly among them. Some were shot where they stood; the rest were loaded onto trains bound for Siberia and the Gulag. Nearly fifty thousand Baltic citizens were deported in that single June, by some estimates as many as sixty-five thousand, and thousands died on the journey. The entire operation was concealed: there were no newspaper or radio reports, and the Kremlin mounted a far-reaching campaign of disinformation and censorship across the Baltics to keep news of these crimes from spreading.

The Baltic deportations were interrupted only by the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Between the 22nd and 28th of June 1941, Lithuania, Hungary, and Romania saw anti-Soviet uprisings, and Nazi propaganda cast the Wehrmacht as a liberator of the Baltic peoples from Soviet oppression – but no sooner were the Soviets expelled than the Nazis imposed an

occupation of their own, exchanging one brutal foreign master for another for three years. The Soviets re-occupied and forcibly re-annexed the Baltic states in 1944.

These Baltic operations form part of a far wider Stalinist practice of ethnically-motivated mass deportation, which the committee should understand as a sustained instrument of Soviet policy rather than an isolated episode. Finns of the Leningrad region were among the first deported on ethnic grounds in 1935; Poles and Koreans followed in 1936 and 1937, the latter some 175,000 souls charged with espionage and removed to Central Asia; and during the war the same fate fell upon Russian-Germans, Karachays, Kalmyks, Chechens and Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, and the Muslim peoples of the Georgian frontier, each accused of collaboration or espionage and each uprooted at staggering human cost. Now, in 1948, confronted with the large insurrection that has followed the annexation of the Baltic states, the Soviet central apparatus has resolved to deport fresh groups of Lithuanians, Estonians, and Latvians – some forty-eight thousand persons sent to Siberia. That the machinery of deportation remains fully operational at the present date is a matter of grave and immediate concern.

Korean Independence

In 1905, in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan unilaterally declared Korea a protectorate, and in August 1910 converted that status into formal annexation, making Korea a colony of the Japanese empire – the first time in Korea's long history that the entire country was subjugated under alien rule. The colonial period fell into three phases: a first stage of draconian gendarmerie-police control from 1910 to 1919; a second, more permissive phase from 1919 to 1932 in which the Government-General allowed a degree of freedom of expression and assembly; and a third, harshly repressive phase from 1932 to 1945, during which the Japanese ruthlessly exploited Korean manpower and resources to fuel their wars in Manchuria, China, and the Pacific. Throughout, Korean nationalists and communists agitated against Japanese rule in scattered movements.

Several rival claimants to national leadership emerged from exile and clandestine organisation. The Korean Independence League, formed in August 1944 under the leftist nationalist Yŏ Un-hyŏng, gave rise to the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI), the interim body established in Seoul immediately upon the Japanese surrender. Korean expatriates in Shanghai had earlier organised the Korean Provisional Government under Dr. Syngman Rhee, the centre of nationalist rightist activity, which drew support from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government and from Korean communities abroad but was largely ignored by the world powers until the war's end. A communist Yen'an Faction, meanwhile, had fought alongside Mao Zedong's forces in northern China and shaped the Korean Volunteer Army under Kim Tu-bong and Mu Chŏng, while another guerrilla current, including Kim Il-sung, had been incorporated into a special task force of the Soviet Far Eastern Command.

The fateful division of the peninsula was improvised in the final days of the war. On the 10th of August 1945 two young American officers drew a line at the 38th parallel demarcating the

intended U.S. and Soviet occupation zones. The divide was meant to be temporary, a mere administrative convenience, but the onset of the Cold War has hardened it into something far more consequential. The Soviet military began occupying the north in August; American forces occupied the south in September and organised the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) in Seoul, governing with the support of the conservative Korean Democratic Party. Each occupying power installed leaders sympathetic to its own cause – the United States favouring Syngman Rhee in the south, the Soviet Union favouring Kim Il-sung in the north – while mutual mistrust prevented the cooperation that a genuine peninsula-wide election would have required. An earlier Moscow agreement of December 1945 to establish a four-power trusteeship over Korea provoked nationwide anti-trusteeship strikes and demonstrations and came to nothing.

In November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly called for a unified Korean government to be chosen through a UN-supervised general election, and created the nine-nation United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to bring it about. The Soviet Union, having vetoed the resolution, refused UNTCOK access to the north, and the Commission accordingly recommended that the election proceed only where it was feasible – that is, in the southern half of the peninsula. That election was held in South Korea in May 1948, amid considerable election-related violence, and a Korean National Assembly has since been convened. At the present date the peninsula stands on the brink of formal and permanent division: a separate southern government is being constituted around Syngman Rhee, a rival communist authority is consolidating in the north under Kim Il-sung, and each side claims to be the sole legitimate representative of the whole Korean people. The machinery for two hostile Korean states is being assembled even as the committee meets.

Costa Rican Civil War 1948

The Costa Rican politics of the present decade have been dominated by Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia, a surgeon who served as president from 1940 to 1944. Barred by law from consecutive re-election, Calderón installed Teodoro Picado as his successor for the 1944 elections while planning his own return in 1948. His administration, founded on an alliance between his Republican party and the Communists – the so-called Caldero-comunista regime – introduced genuine social reforms, including the recognition of workers' rights and minimum wages, but drew fierce opposition. Former president Leon Cortes assembled a loose coalition of the regime's enemies: conservative coffee barons, progressive liberal oligarchs, and the Centristas, united by nothing so much as their shared animosity toward the Caldero-comunista order.

The 1944 election deepened the rupture. Picado, running under the Bloque de la Victoria, defeated the Cortes-led opposition, allegedly winning by a two-to-one margin with 75.1 percent of the vote – but electoral fraud was committed, and the opposition denounced it bitterly. In its aftermath the Centristas broke from the Partido Democrata and joined José Figueres to form the Accion Democrata, which became the Partido Social Democrata in

1945. Figueres and the Social Democrats advanced a potent crisis narrative: that the Caldero-comunista regime had led Costa Rica away from its “exceptional” democratic tradition, tolerating electoral fraud, violations of free speech, disregard for property rights, corruption, and nepotism without accountability, and that the remedy lay in an active citizenry demanding a genuine share in every level of the democratic process.

Picado, in response, cast the country's troubles as the product of global economic crisis and long-standing fiscal weakness, and was driven to propose electoral reform. In December 1945 parliament approved the Minimum Guarantees for the Electoral Process – reorganising the Grand Electoral Council, guaranteeing that all parties could supervise the polling stations, restricting absentee balloting, and entitling electoral supervisors to demand proof of declared results. Under these new rules Picado's party suffered a substantial loss in the February 1946 midterms, though it retained its majority. In late 1946 Calderón announced his candidacy for the 1948 presidency, maintaining the communist alliance even as relations with the Communists had cooled under Picado. The opposition consolidated into the Union Nacional coalition, and in its nomination contest Otilio Ulate, the liberal newspaper proprietor, decisively defeated Figueres.

The disputed presidential election of 1948 – in which the opposition's Otilio Ulate was widely believed to have won – provided the spark. The rebel commander José Figueres rose against the government, aiming to supplant both Picado and Calderón, and in March–April 1948 Costa Rica has passed through a civil war born of the social crisis reaching back to 1940 and of Calderón's efforts to preserve power. The war has pitted Picado's government and its old Communist allies against a broad political opposition. On the 12th of March 1948 the Figueristas launched what they styled the “War of National Liberation.” Its first stage, to the 23rd of March, was a straightforward contest between revolutionaries and pro-government troops; the second, into early April, combined continued hostilities with attempts at negotiation; the third saw the Figueristas make unexpected bids for the key cities of Cartago and Limón; and the fourth brought the implementation of peace by agreement, including President Picado's resignation and the installation of a de facto Junta to govern the country. At the present date that settlement is only just concluded, and the political shape of the country under the new Junta remains to be determined.

Madagascar War

The Madagascar war followed close upon the Second World War, in which many Malagasy soldiers had fought alongside the French army against Nazism and fascism and for the liberation of France itself. From 1939 onward the Malagasy people answered France's call, with some ten thousand five hundred participating in the 1940 campaign and a third of that number dying in combat; the 3rd and 11th Colonial Infantry Regiments and the 42nd Malagasy Machine Gun Battalion particularly distinguished themselves. Yet between the wars Madagascar's resources had been exploited to modernise the island while the demands of its people went unmet, and the experience of wartime service, joined to the growing political maturity of a generation of young intellectuals, sharpened the desire for

freedom. Following the victory over fascism, the Malagasy people demanded greater autonomy within the French Union, as other colonies had secured.

The demand found political voice in the Democratic Movement for the Renovation of Madagascar (MDRM). In March 1946 two young Malagasy deputies, Joseph Raseta and Joseph Ravoahangy, lodged a bill in the National Assembly in Paris demanding independence; Vincent Auriol, the Assembly's president, refused even to have the text printed, calling it an indictment of France and a call to revolt, and the bill was rejected. In the November 1946 elections the three seats reserved for indigenous representation were won by the MDRM leaders Ravoahangy, Raseta, and Jacques Rabemananjara, and in the provincial elections of January 1947 the MDRM won majorities in every provincial assembly save one.

The political struggle erupted into violence on the night of the 29th of March 1947, when two secret societies unleashed a wave of coordinated attacks across many locations, including an assault on the French military garrison at Moramanga that killed twenty French and Senegalese soldiers. Rather than negotiate, the French government resolved to crush the movement, and the result has been one of the deadliest conflicts of the entire French colonial period – a full-scale insurrection in eastern Madagascar met by ferocious repression. The MDRM leaders, including the three deputies to the French Assembly, were outlawed; many members were arrested in April 1947; French troops killed some hundred and fifty MDRM members at Moramanga in May 1947; and the government dissolved the MDRM on the 10th of May 1947.

The human cost has been immense. Between fifteen and thirty thousand individuals have perished in the conflict, alongside some five hundred and fifty Europeans, including three hundred and fifty French soldiers and one hundred and forty French civilians; and it is certain that thousands more of the Malagasy populace have died of famine, cold, and misery while hiding from both the French army and the insurgents in the island's inhospitable tropical forests. The MDRM leaders and many members have been placed on trial before the French Criminal Court at Tananarive, and the repression the French have unleashed has, at the present date, all but vanquished the Malagasy nationalists, leaving Madagascar a colony still. The episode stands as a stark measure of the lengths to which a colonial power will go to hold its empire, and of the price paid by a people demanding self-government.

Vietnam: The Communist Revolution & Viet Minh

The situation in Vietnam must be understood as, in significant part, a product of the wider international conflict of the age – specifically, the Cold War. From 1887 Vietnam had been a French colony within the grouping known as French Indochina. The Viet Minh is a political coalition created by Ho Chi Minh, a former member of the French Communist party who learned his communism in Moscow, with the express intent of establishing independence

from French rule. Its first great political feat came in August 1945, when it seized control of the northern parts of Vietnam – most significantly Hanoi – in the vacuum left by the Japanese collapse. Japan had held much of the north during the war, and after its surrender and withdrawal the Viet Minh wrenched power from the local authorities with relative ease, a process that culminated in Ho Chi Minh's declaration of Hanoi as the birthplace of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

France, however, still held Cochinchina in the south, leaving Vietnam divided between an independent Communist Viet-Minh regime and a colonial one. From March to September of 1946 a succession of negotiations between the Viet Minh and the French produced no meaningful outcome, and the ground was laid for open war. That war opened with the Viet Minh on the back foot. The most notable French effort was Operation Lea, mounted from October to December of 1947 in the hope of ending the war at a single stroke – an ambition its authors likened to the German Schlieffen Plan of the previous war – by driving the Viet Minh from their strongholds and extending French control across northern Vietnam. Though the operation did not achieve its full aim, it forced the Viet Minh into retreat and marked a genuine setback. The Viet Minh also suffered a diplomatic reverse in the loss of Thai support: a November 1947 coup replaced the sympathetic Pridi Panomyong with the anti-communist Phibun Songkhram. In the same year the French installed Bao Dai in Cochinchina as a Vietnamese figurehead they judged controllable.

In the wake of Operation Lea, the Viet Minh created a Supreme Defense Council in 1948 and set about reassessing their military position. That council identified the coalition's principal problems with clarity. Their manner of fighting could best be described as “mobile guerrilla warfare,” distinct from ordinary guerrilla warfare in that the forces engaged were far larger and the objective was annihilation rather than mere attrition. They stressed the necessity of remaining close to the population – holding that terrain temporarily lost could be regained so long as the people were kept close. They acknowledged serious supply and logistical difficulties in certain areas. And they recognised that theirs was not yet a “war of movement,” the eventual goal, because their soldiers remained poorly trained, ill-equipped, and technologically inferior to the enemy, so that combat had to be confined to encirclement, ambush, surprise raids, and combinations of these. To these military problems was added the political task of managing the loss of Thai support and the potential hostility of the new Thai regime. At the present date the Viet Minh hold the north and confront the French-held south, with the decisive campaigns of the war still ahead.

Venezuela: Double Coup d'état

Venezuela's recent history turns on the fragile experiment of democracy. The year 1945 marked the first occasion in the nation's history on which it would be led by a democratically elected president. This came about through a coup d'état against Isaias Medina Angarita, the country's military strongman. Medina's rule was not without accomplishment – it was marked by real strides in women's suffrage and by border settlements with Colombia and Britain – but he protected large corporations and preserved the financial corruption

entrenched in the administration, and for these he was overthrown by an alliance of the military and the party Accion Democratica.

The leader democratically installed in the wake of that upheaval was the novelist Romulo Gallegos. Initially popular, he swiftly lost the backing of the powerful interests on whom his position depended. He cut military funding, souring the very military groups that had brought the democratic order into being, and he undertook a programme of land reform that turned the powerful landowners against him. In mid-November of 1948 Gallegos received a letter from the Army setting out its demands, among them his own resignation. He refused, as was to be expected, and his refusal precipitated a swift and surprisingly bloodless coup led by the military figures Carlos Delgado Chalbaud, Marcos Pérez Jiménez, and Luis Felipe Llovera Páez. Marcos Pérez has been placed in power as the new Venezuelan leader. Thus the democratic experiment that opened in 1945 has, within three years, been closed by the same military hand that opened it – a double coup that leaves Venezuela once more under military rule at the present date.

Malaysia: The Malayan Emergency

The Malayan Emergency, only now beginning, promises to become one of the first significant international anti-communist operations undertaken by the Western powers – and in this committee's timeline it is a situation delegates may find themselves compelled to manage, or even to initiate. It began in June of 1948 when fighters of the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), the military wing of the Malayan Communist Party, set fire to and attacked industrial sites such as mines and rubber plantations, striking at the economic sinews of British Malaya.

The British authorities responded by declaring the territory in a state of “emergency.” The choice of that word over “war” was deliberate and revealing: an emergency, rather than a war, permitted insurers to compensate the owners of destroyed property, which would otherwise have been dismissed as wartime collateral damage – a small but telling illustration of how the commercial interests of empire shape the very language in which its conflicts are described. The MNLA has set about consolidating its presence as a guerrilla force, taking control of small villages, while the British have begun to deploy a range of countermeasures: emergency legislation permitting arrest without trial, and the protection of populated areas designed to win public support and make the population more willing to share information with the authorities.

The contest is, at bottom, one for the loyalty and cooperation of the rural population, and its early course suggests that intelligence and control of the countryside will matter as much as force of arms. The British are learning the particular demands of jungle warfare, seeking to overcome the disadvantage that regular forces suffer when they fight guerrilla bands in unfamiliar terrain – an adaptation that is likely to prove a decisive factor in the campaign to come. At the present date the emergency is in its opening weeks, its outcome wholly unsettled, and its character as a template for anti-insurgent, anti-communist operations elsewhere not yet fully apparent.

